Ukraine: The Pro-Western Coalition Fractures
Stratfor Today » September 3, 2008 |
Summary
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party has withdrawn from Ukraine's ruling pro-Western coalition. The move, which could result in new elections in December, comes in the wake of Russia's Aug. 8 invasion of Georgia, which prompted a great deal of reflection among Ukraine's main political parties.
Analysis
The party of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, Our Ukraine, officially pulled out of the ruling pro-Western coalition Sept. 3 amid a dispute with coalition partner Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. The parties in parliament now have 30 days to form a new ruling coalition before the president will gain the right to dissolve parliament and call for new elections in December.
Though the Ukrainian government has unraveled countless times since the 2004 Orange Revolution brought pro-Western forces into power, this time things are different. Now, the Orangists have hit an impasse over how far they can lead the country toward the West and away from their former master, Moscow. Moreover, Russia has publicly declared Ukraine to be its turf and is using its influence there to ensure that Kiev turns back east.
Ukraine's typical chaotic politicking took on a more serious tone after Russia's Aug. 8 invasion of Georgia. Ukraine has faced Russian meddling since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and Moscow sees Ukraine as perhaps the most important buffer between Russia and the ever-encroaching West. In addition, half the pipelines Russia uses to send oil and natural gas to Europe — one of Moscow's favorite sources of leverage with the Europeans — go through Ukraine. Following the Orange Revolution that brought Yushchenko and Timoshenko to power, it appeared that Ukraine was following the Baltic states West. The European Union and NATO have murmured for years about possible Ukrainian membership, much to Russia's horror.
But Russia has many levers in Ukraine to keep the smaller country from cutting its strings to Moscow. For one, Russia has proved it is not afraid to cut off energy supplies to the country, which in turn affects energy supplies bound for Europe. Ukraine is constantly in debt to Russia over energy supplies, something Moscow tends to bring up whenever Kiev needs a reminder about who it is dependent on.
Next, 20 percent of Ukraine is ethnically Russian, but half the country is pro-Russian — something pro-Western forces constantly fear could split the country in two. The Russian navy also has a major presence in Ukraine's Black Sea port of Sevastopol, acting as still another reminder of Russian power in the country.
Adding to this list of levers, Moscow controls one of the three main political factions in Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and is now showing that it has embedded itself in the pro-Western forces as well. After the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian politics had three main parties: the two pro-Western parties, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and Timoshenko's eponymous party; and the pro-Russian Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovich. The three political groupings have continually fought for control of the government. Though Timoshenko is technically Orangist and pro-Western, she has occasionally teamed up with Yanukovich against Yuschenko for personal gain.
But the redefinition of Ukraine following Russia's war with Georgia has made Ukraine's factions reconsider the country's position between the West and Russia, giving the typical ego struggle among the three political leaders a more serious edge. While Russia proved it is capable of more than just simple meddling in its former Soviet states, it also became apparent that Moscow had infiltrated beyond the Party of Regions and into the pro-Western forces in Ukraine.
Yushchenko took the lead against Russian "aggressions" in Georgia, but his coalition partner, Timoshenko, flipped on him and heralded Moscow's cause. His Orangist parliamentary partner blocked every move Yushchenko made to counter Russia, from attempts to oust the Russian military from Crimea to sending forces to aid the Georgian military. It became very clear early on in the war whose side Timoshenko was taking. This is not to say Timoshenko is pro-Russian, but rather that she believes an alliance with Moscow will prove most beneficial to her at present. Yushchenko responded by having treason and corruption investigations brought against the premier, though Timoshekno has not been charged.
Timoshenko countered Yushchenko's moves Sept. 2 by pushing laws through parliament that strip him of his veto power on prime ministerial candidates and facilitate the procedure for impeaching the president. The two leaders have split the pro-Western forces, with half wanting to rush to the West's side and the other half wanting to avoid moves that will further agitate Russia. Rumors have circulated for weeks that the coalition would break, possibly sparking snap elections.
Yushchenko had sought to avoid that option for two main reasons. First, his approval rating is barely above 20 percent, and his party only holds 14 percent of parliament and is divided on how to proceed. Yushchenko tried to keep his party from splitting the coalition, but a little more than half the party members went their own way, ignoring his wishes. Yushchenko thus probably will not do well enough in new elections to hold any power in the new parliament.
Second, Timoshenko could possibly team up with the Party of Regions to form a new coalition now or after new elections. She is a free agent available to the top bidder at the moment, and Moscow is bidding highest. Sources in Kiev have told Stratfor that Timoshenko is in negotiations not with Yanukovich, but with the Party of Regions' true Ukrainian puppet master, Rinat Akhmentov, who is emerging from the shadows more than before. Akhmetov and Timoshenko have been enemies for many years, constantly struggling politically and in the business world. But Moscow's intervention has produced a temporary peace between the two to allow them to combat Yushchenko and the true pro-Western forces.
Despite these challenges, Yushchenko cannot be completely discounted yet. He is now the only pro-Western element in Ukrainian politics, meaning some of Timoshenko's group could defect if they are loyal to their ideology. Also, the president will be the sole political force for the West to support, both politically and financially.
The Europeans can thus be expected to send generous aid to Our Ukraine in hopes of funding its revival. A peace deal between Timoshenko and the pro-Russian forces also can be expected at any time, but its longevity is doubtful. Either way, Ukraining politics will remain interesting, especially since Yushchenko, Timoshenko, Yanukovich and Akhmentov are all eyeing the presidency, which is up for grabs in early 2010.
But there is one more component to the redefinition taking place in Ukraine. Russia has been happy in the past few years with an unstable, chaotic Ukraine that is unable to organize itself to move toward the West and away from Moscow. But now that Russia has laid its claim on Ukraine and has its levers well-oiled, it could be looking for a more permanent and clear sign that the country is back in Russia's sphere. This would mean Russia will have to settle some of Ukraine's internal political disputes and crush a few egos in order to set up a more stable and lasting shop — something Ukraine has not seen since Moscow last called the shots.
Ukraine: The Pro-Western Coalition Fractures
Stratfor Today » September 3, 2008 |
Summary
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party has withdrawn from Ukraine's ruling pro-Western coalition. The move, which could result in new elections in December, comes in the wake of Russia's Aug. 8 invasion of Georgia, which prompted a great deal of reflection among Ukraine's main political parties.
Analysis
The party of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, Our Ukraine, officially pulled out of the ruling pro-Western coalition Sept. 3 amid a dispute with coalition partner Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. The parties in parliament now have 30 days to form a new ruling coalition before the president will gain the right to dissolve parliament and call for new elections in December.
Though the Ukrainian government has unraveled countless times since the 2004 Orange Revolution brought pro-Western forces into power, this time things are different. Now, the Orangists have hit an impasse over how far they can lead the country toward the West and away from their former master, Moscow. Moreover, Russia has publicly declared Ukraine to be its turf and is using its influence there to ensure that Kiev turns back east.
Ukraine's typical chaotic politicking took on a more serious tone after Russia's Aug. 8 invasion of Georgia. Ukraine has faced Russian meddling since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and Moscow sees Ukraine as perhaps the most important buffer between Russia and the ever-encroaching West. In addition, half the pipelines Russia uses to send oil and natural gas to Europe — one of Moscow's favorite sources of leverage with the Europeans — go through Ukraine. Following the Orange Revolution that brought Yushchenko and Timoshenko to power, it appeared that Ukraine was following the Baltic states West. The European Union and NATO have murmured for years about possible Ukrainian membership, much to Russia's horror.
But Russia has many levers in Ukraine to keep the smaller country from cutting its strings to Moscow. For one, Russia has proved it is not afraid to cut off energy supplies to the country, which in turn affects energy supplies bound for Europe. Ukraine is constantly in debt to Russia over energy supplies, something Moscow tends to bring up whenever Kiev needs a reminder about who it is dependent on.
Next, 20 percent of Ukraine is ethnically Russian, but half the country is pro-Russian — something pro-Western forces constantly fear could split the country in two. The Russian navy also has a major presence in Ukraine's Black Sea port of Sevastopol, acting as still another reminder of Russian power in the country.
Adding to this list of levers, Moscow controls one of the three main political factions in Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and is now showing that it has embedded itself in the pro-Western forces as well. After the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian politics had three main parties: the two pro-Western parties, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and Timoshenko's eponymous party; and the pro-Russian Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovich. The three political groupings have continually fought for control of the government. Though Timoshenko is technically Orangist and pro-Western, she has occasionally teamed up with Yanukovich against Yuschenko for personal gain.
But the redefinition of Ukraine following Russia's war with Georgia has made Ukraine's factions reconsider the country's position between the West and Russia, giving the typical ego struggle among the three political leaders a more serious edge. While Russia proved it is capable of more than just simple meddling in its former Soviet states, it also became apparent that Moscow had infiltrated beyond the Party of Regions and into the pro-Western forces in Ukraine.
Yushchenko took the lead against Russian "aggressions" in Georgia, but his coalition partner, Timoshenko, flipped on him and heralded Moscow's cause. His Orangist parliamentary partner blocked every move Yushchenko made to counter Russia, from attempts to oust the Russian military from Crimea to sending forces to aid the Georgian military. It became very clear early on in the war whose side Timoshenko was taking. This is not to say Timoshenko is pro-Russian, but rather that she believes an alliance with Moscow will prove most beneficial to her at present. Yushchenko responded by having treason and corruption investigations brought against the premier, though Timoshekno has not been charged.
Timoshenko countered Yushchenko's moves Sept. 2 by pushing laws through parliament that strip him of his veto power on prime ministerial candidates and facilitate the procedure for impeaching the president. The two leaders have split the pro-Western forces, with half wanting to rush to the West's side and the other half wanting to avoid moves that will further agitate Russia. Rumors have circulated for weeks that the coalition would break, possibly sparking snap elections.
Yushchenko had sought to avoid that option for two main reasons. First, his approval rating is barely above 20 percent, and his party only holds 14 percent of parliament and is divided on how to proceed. Yushchenko tried to keep his party from splitting the coalition, but a little more than half the party members went their own way, ignoring his wishes. Yushchenko thus probably will not do well enough in new elections to hold any power in the new parliament.
Second, Timoshenko could possibly team up with the Party of Regions to form a new coalition now or after new elections. She is a free agent available to the top bidder at the moment, and Moscow is bidding highest. Sources in Kiev have told Stratfor that Timoshenko is in negotiations not with Yanukovich, but with the Party of Regions' true Ukrainian puppet master, Rinat Akhmentov, who is emerging from the shadows more than before. Akhmetov and Timoshenko have been enemies for many years, constantly struggling politically and in the business world. But Moscow's intervention has produced a temporary peace between the two to allow them to combat Yushchenko and the true pro-Western forces.
Despite these challenges, Yushchenko cannot be completely discounted yet. He is now the only pro-Western element in Ukrainian politics, meaning some of Timoshenko's group could defect if they are loyal to their ideology. Also, the president will be the sole political force for the West to support, both politically and financially.
The Europeans can thus be expected to send generous aid to Our Ukraine in hopes of funding its revival. A peace deal between Timoshenko and the pro-Russian forces also can be expected at any time, but its longevity is doubtful. Either way, Ukraining politics will remain interesting, especially since Yushchenko, Timoshenko, Yanukovich and Akhmentov are all eyeing the presidency, which is up for grabs in early 2010.
But there is one more component to the redefinition taking place in Ukraine. Russia has been happy in the past few years with an unstable, chaotic Ukraine that is unable to organize itself to move toward the West and away from Moscow. But now that Russia has laid its claim on Ukraine and has its levers well-oiled, it could be looking for a more permanent and clear sign that the country is back in Russia's sphere. This would mean Russia will have to settle some of Ukraine's internal political disputes and crush a few egos in order to set up a more stable and lasting shop — something Ukraine has not seen since Moscow last called the shots.